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an inion arg i g 
h go d-faith i1 ould be reached, t at 
rul sh u d b_ mo ified, an that p obable cause did exist withi 
t he Ag ilar-Spinelli framework. JPS as circu lated a dissen _i g 
i iop1n1an, 'ch WJB hac joined , arguing t hat, even der a total-
i y of th_ circumstanc s approach, there was not probable cause 
to obtain the warrant to search the house. JB is working o a 
parate dissent • 
In my iview, JPS may well have the best of the arguments
here, but I assume that you continue to believe that the infor a-
tion available to the police constituted probable cause. If so, 
I r commend that you join WHR's opinion. Although BRW makes a 
dec nt argument that the Court has jurisdiction to decide the 
good-faith exception question , he fails entirely to deal with 
's di cussion of by as a prudential matter , if not a juris-
c onal on , it would be inappropriate to decide that issue in 
hi cas • th n you hould stick with your Conference vote to 
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decide this case on the is1ssue on which cert was granted original-
ly. 
On the me ri ts of t he Fourth Amendme nt question , WHR replaces 
the two prongs of t he Aqu i lar-Spinelli test with a to tality o f 
the circumstances appr oach whereby the informer's reliabili ty and 
basis of knowledge are relevant considerations but no t independ-
ent requireme nts. I find this treatment of t he problem, while 
"mushy," more straightforward and workable than BRW's analys i s o f 
how the affidavit satisfies Aguilar and Spinelli. WHR's approach 
of e xami ning the information available to the police in common 
sense terms, rather than BRW's approach of placing that informa-
tion i n discrete categories, is more likely to result in coherent 
and consistent Fourth Amendment law. In short, I think WHR has 
done a good job; if his draft becomes the opinion of the Court by 
gaining your vote and the CJ's, the Court will have come around 
to your old court's approach in Spinelli. 
No WHR Fourth Amendment opinion would be complete without a 
few curveballs; I think you may wish to request changes concern-
i of the following: 1ng some 
the first full ,, , i the last two sentences, 1. On p. 6, ln 
consideration i fashioning a good WHR refers to "an important 1n 
r 
fa i t h exception" and to "consideration of the modification of the 
exclusionary rule." I would prefer to say "an important consid-
eration in determining whether to fashion a good faith exception" 
a nd •consider tion of hether to modify the exclusionary rule." 
2. On p. 11, th cond 
, the long concluding sentence 
c i th t it i 
I 
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did n t. The letter did predict that Lance would fly from Chica-
go to West Palm on May 5t h , but did not predict the behavior 
detailed in the remainder of t hat sentence . 
3. On p. 20, the last sentence of t he carryover paragraph 
cites the Model Code o f Pre-Arraignment Pr ocedure. The Code 
states that proba ble c a use does not mean "more probable than 
not." LaFave also takes this position, but no te s that the 
Court's prior c ases may suggest that a greate r than 50 % likeli-
hood i s r equ i red. I would either delete this citation or add a 
cite to LaFave's more comprehensive discussion of the problem: W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure §3.2(e) (1978). 
4 . On p. 22, the first full,,, I would eliminate the quo t e 
f rom a nd citation to BRW's dissent in Miranda. 
5. Later in the same paragraph, WHR twice indicates t hat 
Sp inelli has made it impossible to make use of anonymous tips. 
Th is exaggeration comes across as fairly silly; the value of 
a nonymous tips is that they clue officers in to the need to i1n-
vestigate, and investigation need not take the form of searches 
conducted with a questionable degree of objective suspicion. 
6. The last two sentences of ,,1 of n. 14 assume that Sue 
Gate s originally intended to fly back to Chicago, but revised her 
tr a vel plans. WHR's point is that the inaccuracy in the inform-
er ' s pred i ction of Sue's travel plans is insignificant because 
travelers o fte n change their plans. There is no basis, however, 
for the assumption that Sue in fact changed her plans. 
• 
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If WHR will take the more important of these changes (my 
i
ran i g of their importance would be 4, 1, 6, -/ 2, 3, 5) , I r ecom-
mend that you join his opinion. 
a 
ASM 
